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Introduction 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) provide access to
cash, confidential information and services for service
users of all types, cultures and abilities, across the
globe. The standard authentication mechanism by
which these users gain access to ATMs consists of use
of a token (in the form of a bank card) combined with a
password known as a personal identity number (PIN),
that can be between 4 and 12 digits (for instance, 4
digits are used in the UK, 5 digits are used in South
Africa and 6 in France). Yet this mechanism, which is
based on knowledge retained by the person, is
unsatisfactory. Passwords are easily forgotten. Users
deal with this problem by behaving in a manner that
reduces the security: by writing down their PIN, or
making them all the same, or disclosing them to friends
and family.2 Whilst security administrators may blame
the user for the failure in securing their PIN, in reality
the method of authentication chosen by banks as a
means of authentication at the ATM disregards users’
innate cognitive abilities and limitations. Awareness is
emerging of the need to design authentication with
these abilities and limitations in mind, with researchers
at IBM describing this as ‘a critical area for research’.3
NCR, a leading ATM manufacturer, employs experts to
address these issues specifically.
This article explores the literature in respect of current
Western authentication systems, together with an
overview of some of the main authentication
alternatives. In considering current and proposed
authentication mechanisms, information is drawn from a
range of sources, including journal articles, conference
proceedings, company reports and sales literature for
security products designed for use on mobile
telephones and the internet. These mechanisms are
examined under the following headings: authentication;
pervasive mechanisms and known user behaviours;
usability and universal design at the ATM; how we
remember, and a taxonomy of alternative authentication
methods.
Throughout this article, reference will be made to the
term ‘usability’. ‘Usability’ is a quality that can be
measured in relation to the ease of use of a computer
application. The elements that make up usability
comprise the following:
a.Learnability: this tests the ease with which users
can complete basic tasks the first time they
encounter the computer system.
b.Efficiency: this measures how quickly users can
perform tasks once they are familiar with the
system.
c. Memorability: this tests how easily users can re-
establish competence after a period of not using the
system.
d.The number of times users make mistakes are
measured, as is the extent of the errors that are
made by users.
e.Measures of satisfaction establish if users find the
system enjoyable to use, and utility measures
whether the system does what the user needs it to
do.
Authentication: pervasive mechanisms and
known user behaviours
In this section, how people use authentication
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mechanisms and their known behaviours are reviewed
across the broad range of prevailing mechanisms, rather
than limiting the review to ATMs. Whilst ATMs have very
specific requirements for speed, security and usability in
a small space, knowledge-based authentication
mechanisms in general share common issues,
regardless of which form of device the person is
required to interact with. It is pertinent that an account
can be viewed through an ATM, the internet, the counter
at a bank, and from point of sale machines in retail
outlets. A different authentication mechanism might be
required for each avenue by which a person can obtain
access to their account. This can cause problems for the
person, such as memory interference, which in turn
causes memory confusion, which in turn leads to
insecure behaviour towards ATM security.4 By
understanding the broader picture, it is possible to
more fully understand the behaviour of users when
interacting with authentication mechanisms, which in
turn helps to formulate future research.
Context
ATMs provide access to cash, confidential information
and services to consumers across the globe. Machines
may be located indoors or outdoors, in a wide range of
climates, but are usually in a public place. The banks
authenticate a customer with the use of a token, in the
form of a bank card, and a PIN.
Mechanism
Current user authentication systems are based on the
knowledge of the user, yet this approach is known to be
error-prone.5 Knowledge-based authentication systems
require selection of a strong password to resist attack.
Ideally, a password should consist of a set of eight or
more randomly allocated characters, incorporating
upper and lower case characters, digits and special
characters.6 Yet this is extremely difficult for users to
remember. Similarly, a numeric password – or PIN
number – made up of a series of digits appears
challenging for users to remember, and can be easily
changed to a code that is easy to crack. In addition, up
to 50 per cent of users write down their PIN number and
store it in close proximity to the matching bank card.7
An extra layer of complexity is introduced by the
variety of mechanisms applied to a single account,
depending on how the customer is required to obtain
access to the account. For example, one leading UK
bank requires customers to use four different
mechanisms to obtain access to the same account:
At the bank: presentation of the bank card, plus a
manuscript signature, is considered adequate.
ATM: presentation of the bank card and entry of the
correct PIN number.
Internet: a combination of customer number, a
random selection of digits from the user identification
code (this is different to the PIN number or the
account number) plus ‘secret’ personal information.
Making a payment via the internet: in addition to the
above, the customer must insert their bank card into a
separate card reader supplied by the bank, enter their
PIN, then enter the random number displayed on the
card reader into their internet banking session.
From the bank’s perspective, this may be simple to
administer, but from a usability perspective, it is
doubtful that it provides user satisfaction. For instance,
in a study of Canadian banks, on-line banking
customers reported that they found documented
security practices confusing and extremely difficult to
comply with.8
People
People involved in the use of authentication systems
can be divided into three groups: administrators,
legitimate users and unauthorized users.
Administrators understandably want to protect ‘their’
systems from attack by unauthorized users. It is
common for security departments in organisations not
to have any contact with their legitimate users, and to
fail to communicate with them. Such detachment can
lead to a failure to understand users’ needs and
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objectives, resulting in the creation of unusable security
systems. It may seem reasonable to an administrator to
create a system that enforces regular password
changes, because users are unlikely to change them
otherwise. Yet the same system may be perceived as a
hindrance by users, because frequent password
changes add to the burden placed on human memory,
known as ‘memory burden’. Similarly, administrators
may assign individual passwords when it may be more
appropriate to share a common password across an
organisational unit. A parallel may be found in joint
bank accounts, where each card holder is given a
different PIN or password to the same account.
As a result of security being forced upon them by the
organisation rather than tailored to their needs, users
do not consider themselves to be accountable for
security as much as the bank might wish them to be.
When the purpose of the security mechanism is unclear
or inappropriate, the motivation to comply is weakened,
thus eroding the culture that ought to accompany
security. The system may be perceived as an obstacle to
‘real’ work, which therefore must be circumvented.9 The
failure is compounded when security administrators
advise users to write down their passwords: this is a
clear indication that the authentication mechanism is
not viable.
The error rate, a measure of usability, may be high
because legitimate users have difficulty remembering
passwords that are less vulnerable to cracking – known
as ‘strong’ passwords. While 94 per cent of users can
remember semantic passwords, they can remember
syntactic passwords only 35 per cent of the time.10 The
‘Power Law of Forgetting’ explains that not only do
individuals forget a great deal quickly, but their memory
is further eroded over time.11 For a password to be
remembered without resort to an insecure aide-memoir
of some form (usually by writing it down), it must be
encoded within long term memory. To achieve this, the
password must be meaningful or easy to work out,
practiced, based on information that is personal to the
user that is already familiar, and incorporated into a
special memory scheme. It is difficult to apply these
criteria to strong passwords.
Given that most people in the twenty-first century are
required to remember a number of passwords for
different purposes, users may mix up which password
applies to which authentication mechanism. This
phenomenon is known as ‘interference’. At one industry
site, where users had 16 different passwords for use
within the organisation, it was extremely common to
forget passwords, or mix up which password was used
for which system, because of intra-password
interference.12 An added layer of confusion is also
generated when different rules for the creation of
passwords are enforced in different systems.
Standing at an ATM in a public place and observed by
others, users may feel pressurised when trying to recall
their password. This pressure can itself adversely affect
recall. Failure to recall their password can generate
embarrassment in the user when they are observed by
others, but it may also generate a suspicion of wrong-
doing amongst observers.13 Further pressure may be
added if a user is aware of the risks of being observed
either directly or by a hidden camera when entering
their password: a phenomenon known as ‘shoulder-
surfing’.
The card holder may give another person authority to
use their card and PIN. The authority may be given
expressly or by implication, such as how they deal with
their card within the family, for example. A person that
has authority to use the card and PIN is not expected to
use the card beyond the authority given to them by the
card holder. When a user shares their password with a
colleague, friend or family member, they are in effect
sharing the method by which they are authenticated
and, by extension, authorisation to use the facilities that
may be afforded to the user when using an ATM, for
instance. Depending on the terms and conditions of
use, the organisation operating the authentication
mechanism may consider this practice to be insecure.
However, it may be reasonable from the perspective of
the user to share their authentication details with
others. It is certainly extremely common – 36 per cent of
users admit to sharing their PIN with someone,
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although the real percentage is likely to be higher.
Some users even view it as desirable that they share
their authentication details.14 The card holder authorises
the other person to act within the scope of the authority
grated by the person whose password is used. For
instance, the woman manages the finances in 70 per
cent of households, thus it may not be acceptable for
her to refuse to tell her partner the PIN for the family
bank account. Disabled users may be unable to obtain
access to the ATM because of cognitive or physical
limitations. By necessity, they may need to divulge their
PIN to enable a helper to obtain access to the ATM with
their authority. Using knowledge-based authentication
mechanisms that are easily communicated verbally or in
writing means it is difficult to prevent passwords from
being shared.
People posing as legitimate users can exploit poor
usability. When organisations routinely ask users for
their password in order to resolve usability difficulties
with the security mechanism, they open the way for
malign users to trick legitimate users into divulging
their passwords. The poor design of a security system
often requires users to share their passwords with an
administrator. This in turn enables an attacker to use
various social engineering techniques to trick legitimate
users into divulging their passwords. An ATM with a
mouse or clearly displayed fixed position keys,
facilitates shoulder-surfing, sometimes known as
‘observer attack’.15 Software applications that help
thieves are common, but the threat is poorly understood
by legitimate users. Multilingual dictionary attack
software can break 85 per cent of passwords through a
simple exhaustive search. Rule-based attacks extend
this capability further, altering known words according
to a number of rules, for example searching on words
written backwards.16
Design for ATM users
Characteristics of ATM users
There is no such thing as a ‘typical’ user at the ATM.
Young, old, able-bodied and disabled may all wish to
use ATMs. Yet ability and disability are not distinct
categories. A wide range of physical, cognitive and
sensory abilities may be displayed by users. Abilities
may fluctuate, affected by circumstance at any given
point in time. This makes it difficult to provide a
universal design. For example, consider an elderly
person who is holding a number of bags of shopping.
Without the bags of shopping, they are normally able-
bodied and alert, yet when carrying the bags of
shopping, they are temporarily ‘disabled’. Their physical
function is hampered by tangible external constraints,
as they juggle shopping bags whilst entering their PIN.
Furthermore, older adults generally find it more difficult
to use computer software than younger people.17
Usability of current mechanisms
As previously discussed, the prevailing knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms are not very good.
Users are generally not very satisfied with them, and
there are high error rates. Further problems include
difficulty in memorising passwords and learning how to
use authentication systems.
Knowledge-based authentication mechanisms place a
requirement on people that passwords be recalled
correctly, otherwise the user will fail to obtain access to
the service or system. People find it difficult to
remember passwords, because not enough
consideration is given to the difficulty that people
experience in recalling passwords that are not
frequently used. The cognitive ability to remember
imprecisely is not taken into account. The policy of
many knowledge-based mechanisms is that if the user
fails to key in the correct password on the third attempt,
they are denied access to the service or system,
regardless of a realistic security appraisal of security
requirements.18 When an account holder wants to check
the balance on a seldom-used account without
withdrawing cash, for instance, it is a matter of debate
as to whether their bank card should be revoked if they
get one digit wrong on the PIN number.
When a user chooses a new password, they find it
very difficult to learn the new password if it is created in
the random way that is usually required. The lack of
understanding of what constitutes a strong password
can lead to the creation of weak passwords that are
vulnerable to attack. It is rare for training to be provided
on how to create a secure password. Without
14 Rachna Dhamija and Adrian Perrig, ‘Deja vu: A
user study using images for authentication’,
Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX
Security Symposium.
15 Volker Roth, Kai Richter and Rene Freidinger, ‘A
PIN-entry method resilient against shoulder
surfing’, Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security,
(Washington DC, USA) (ACM, 2004), 236-245.
16 Rachna Dhamija and Adrian Perrig, ‘Deja vu: A
user study using images for authentication’,
Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX
Security Symposium.
17 Ann Chadwick-Dias, Michelle McNulty and Tom
Tullis, ‘Web usability and age: how design
changes can improve performance’, Proceedings
of the 2003 Conference on Universal Usability,
(ACM Conference on Universal Usability, 2003), 
30-37.
18 Sacha Brostoff and Angela Sasse, ‘“Ten strikes
and you’re out”: Increasing the number of login
attempts can improve password usability’,
Workshop on Human-Computer Interaction and
Security Systems part of Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems 2003, 5-10 April
2003, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
120 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
PINS, PASSWORDS AND HUMAN MEMORY
appropriate help and advice when a weak password is
selected, the user’s inaccurate understanding of security
remains uncorrected, and security is undermined. This
means that the utility of the mechanism that is designed
to help provide for security is poor. This in turn reflects
on the inability of those people responsible for security
to understand that the very measures they have
implemented are not secure, and illustrates their failure
to design truly secure systems.
Conflict between security and usability
The need to provide for security whilst also providing a
system that is relatively easy to use can be in conflict.
For an authentication mechanism to be secure, it must
use passwords that are secret, and there must be a very
wide range of possible passwords available for users to
use. For example, if a password can only be two
characters in length, it will be far easier to guess than
one that is six characters long. Further, the security of a
password should be rated for the ability of a potentially
malign user to observe the code, guess the code and
record the code. Users can be perceived by
administrators as undesirable, because they undermine
secure systems. They allow their passwords to be
observed. They create weak, guessable passwords.
They record them in obvious places. Users feel justified
in adopting such insecure, apparently careless,
behaviour by systems that are poor to use, and that
seem inadequately matched to user needs. In contrast,
part of the success of hackers can be attributed to the
attention that they pay to users and their behaviour.19
Users do have a shared purpose with the system and
its administrators, but a perceptual divide exists. It is in
the interests of both administrators and users to protect
data. Unfortunately, there is little dialogue or shared
understanding between the two groups regarding what
security needs really exist. System designers follow a
simplistic approach to security. Users are thus subjected
to an impossible burden to memorise complex
passwords, forced to remember multiple passwords,
and often given no guidance on what makes a password
secure.20
Reducing conflict
If authentication mechanisms are to become more
usable, they must incorporate usability considerations
from the start. Knowledge-based systems could use a
single sign-on for a whole system and also reduce
forced changes, thus reducing the burden on memory.
Alternative approaches to authentication, such as
graphical or biometric authentication, are also possible.
A shift of emphasis needs to occur. Rather than users
and security designers being in conflict, a partnership
might be promoted, with an emphasis on shared aims.
Communication is essential. By involving users from the
start, security system designers can understand users’
needs and develop systems that are compatible with
their requirements. The degree of security can be
appropriate to the risk. Systems can be evaluated for
usability with users before being implemented. Cost
savings can be made by paying attention to the needs
and abilities of users. As passwords are forgotten less,
there is less need to spend corporate time and effort
resetting them. Moreover, satisfied users are more likely
to abide by the security rules.
The value of training users to create strong passwords
is disputed: Sasse and her colleagues found that user
training increased usability of security systems,21 yet Yan
and others found that this did not significantly improve
the strength of the passwords that were created.22
Online guidance during the process of creating a
password may be a better approach. This method is
now used by some online service providers. For
example, GoogleMail provides real-time feedback to
show if a password is weak, fair or strong. The use of
colour coding and a bar chart helps to reinforce the
comments offered in respect to a password used by a
customer. The security software reviews the proposed
password as the user types it in. For example, in the
process of typing the password ‘secret12’, the following
comments are provided:
‘secret1’ is reported as ‘too short’
‘secret12’ is reported as ‘fair’
‘Secret12’ is reported as ‘strong’, because of to the
inclusion of an upper case letter
Further advice is given to users on creating a strong
password if the user clicks on a link on the same web
page, entitled ‘Password strength’. Whilst such online
guidance forces users to choose a strong password, it
19 Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse, ‘Users
are not the enemy’, Communications of the ACM.
20 Martina Angela Sasse, Sacha Brostoff and Dirk
Weirich, ‘Transforming the weakest link - a
human/computer interaction approach to usable
and effective security’, BT Technology Journal.
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not the enemy’, Communications of the ACM;
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Weirich, ‘Transforming the weakest link - a
human/computer interaction approach to usable
and effective security’, BT Technology Journal.
22 Jianxin Yan, Alan Blackwell, Ross Anderson and
Alan Grant, ‘The Memorability and Security of
Passwords – Some Empirical Results’, Technical
report No. 500 (Cambridge University Computer
Laboratory, 2000).
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can also be used to provide the rationale for security,
and enable the user to understand what makes up a
strong password.
How we remember
Limitations in the way people remember make it difficult
to recall alphanumeric passwords. The ‘Power Law of
Forgetting’23 describes how an individual may
experience rapid forgetting immediately after learning,
followed by a further gradual decay. Over time, recall
becomes progressively more inaccurate. This inaccuracy
is a particular problem when password authentication
demands total accuracy. Retroactive interference, where
new additions to memory disrupt existing memories,
adds to the problem. It may be inferred that multiple
passwords are particularly prone to retroactive
interference.
Recall is easier when distinct items are familiar, and
when they are associated with each other. Mnemonics
are useful in exploiting this feature of memory. Amongst
the mnemonic systems of memorization, two commonly
used techniques are loci and PegWords. Using the loci
technique, locations serve as retrieval cues for the
information being recalled. PegWords entail learning a
series of words that serve as ‘pegs’ on which memories
can be hung. Both techniques have been used in trials
of authentication mechanisms.24
In contrast to their imperfect ability to recall, ‘humans
have a vast, almost limitless memory for pictures’ – an
ability known as the ‘Picture Superiority Effect’.25 Unlike
recall, picture recognition appears to be relatively
unaffected by the process of ageing. There remains
some debate as to why pictures are significantly easier
to remember than words. The Dual-code theory
suggests that the advantage springs from the brain
remembering pictures simultaneously in two different
ways, using an image code and a semantic code.
Another possibility is that pictures generate a more
detailed memory, and are thus easier to extract from
long term memory.26 Regardless of this debate, the brain
has a proven greater capacity to store and recognise
pictures over letters and numbers. This makes images
an excellent candidate for authentication mechanisms,
especially given the acknowledged failings of current
knowledge based authentication mechanisms.
Alternative authentication mechanisms
Despite the prevalence of knowledge-based
authentication at the ATM and online, research
continues into alternatives, such as graphical
authentication and mechanisms that monitor an
individual’s behaviour and include additional security
checks when their behaviour deviates from its normal
pattern. The use of biometric measurements is a further
option, but is outside of the scope of this article. Further
details on biometric measurements can be found in the
dissertation from which this paper is drawn.27 No
mechanism is perfect: all have limitations. The ideal
password should be easy to remember but hard to
guess. As Renaud comments, ‘any authentication
mechanism teeters between memorability and
predictability requirements’.28
Personalisation and behaviour
An emergent trend in security mechanisms is the
tracking of patterns of user behaviour. If a user who
travels relatively little takes a holiday abroad, they may
be surprised and inconvenienced to find their card
disabled, when security software notices an abnormal
transaction. Conversely, the same user may be relieved
when the system prevents their account from being
used by a thief. Sasse highlights the desirability of
determining the method of authentication after taking
into account the nature of the task.29 For instance, a user
could be asked for less stringent authentication if they
are performing a task that fits their normal behaviour
pattern, and a more stringent method of authentication
if their behaviour is unusual. For example, a customer
consistently withdraws £20 from her local ATM. If she
tries to take out £200 from a different ATM, she will be
prompted for extra authentication. This approach is
consistent with current societal trends that demand
speed and an individual approach from technology
services. They may provide increased customer loyalty
as a result. The approach does not provide
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memory’, Psychological Science, 2, 1991, 396-408.
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strategic solutions, Volume 1, 2002, 161-169.
26 Antonella De Angeli, Lynne Coventry, Graham
Johnson and Karen Renaud, ‘Is a picture really
worth a thousand words? Exploring the feasibility
of graphical authentication systems’, International
Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Volume 63,
Issue 1-2, (July 2005), 128-152.
27 Wendy Moncur, ‘Exploring the usability of multiple
graphic passwords’, MSc Dissertation, retrieved
from http://www.csd.abdn.ac.uk/~wmoncur
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of%20multiple%20graphical%20passwords.doc,
2006.
28 Karen Renaud and Antonella De Angeli, ‘My
password is here! An investigation into visuo-
spatial authentication mechanisms’, Interacting
with Computers, Volume 16, Issue 6, December
2004, 1039.
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authentication in itself. It must be combined with other
approaches, such as knowledge-based or graphical
authentication before it can be assessed for
memorability and predictability.
Graphical authentication mechanisms
Graphical authentication mechanisms use picture
recognition to authenticate the user. This is based on
the understanding that people remember images far
better than words.30 They can remember more images,
more accurately, and with less adverse effects from the
process of aging. An attractive feature of graphical
authentication mechanisms is that they are harder to
disclose than PINs and semantic or syntactic
passwords. Research into the potential of graphical
authentication continues.
Graphical authentication systems have their own
requirements relating to usability. It is recognised that
images used must be concrete, nameable and distinct.31
Each image displayed must be visually dissimilar, and
from a separate semantic category. For example, if a
user is shown ten images, ideally they should each be
from a separate category such as transport, mammals,
faces, architecture, to prevent the user from mixing
images of a similar nature. Conceivably, they should not
be shown two pictures of the same item, such as
flowers on the same screen, because this can cause
confusion. The effects of interference on memorability
when a user has many separate graphical passwords
are small in comparison to that exhibited when a user
has multiple knowledge-based passwords.32
Immaturity of authentication systems
Successful authentication mechanisms should provide a
balance between security and usability. Yet no current
authentication mechanism fits all the requirements:
every mechanism has its failings. Providers of secure
systems must look to their users, and to understand
and accept their innate cognitive and physical
limitations, if they are to create authentication
mechanisms that are usable, and thus less flawed. In
the meantime, users will continue to exhibit insecure
behaviours, circumventing the best intentions of secure
systems.
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